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ABSTRACT 
Our study has two aims: (1) to elaborate theoretical frameworks and introduce social 
mechanisms of spontaneous co-operation in repeated buyer-seller relationships and (2) 
to formulate hypotheses which can be empirically tested. The basis of our chain of 
ideas is the simple two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game. On the one hand, its 
repeated variation can be applicable for the distinction of the analytical types of trust 
(iteration trust, strategy trust) in co-operations. On the other hand, it provides a chance 
to reveal those dyadic sympathy-antipathy relations, which make us understand the 
evolution of trust. Then we introduce the analysis of the more complicated (more than 
two-person) buyer-seller relationship. Firstly, we outline the possible role of the 
structural balancing mechanisms in forming trust in three-person buyer-seller 
relationships. Secondly, we put forward hypotheses to explain complex buyer-seller 
networks. In our research project we try to theoretically combine some of the simple 
concepts of game theory with certain ideas of the social-structural balance theory. 
Finally, it is followed by a short summary.   
 
 
1 CO-OPERATION IN BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIP AS A TWO-PERSON 
ONE-SHOT PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME     
  
Let’s take the following simple example. A buyer and a seller interact on the market. (Opp 
1987). Let’s start out from the standard postulates of the rational choice theory (Osborne 
2004): suppose that the buyer and the seller (A1 and A2) are instrumentally rational (utility 
maximizer) and selfish, moreover, the game is played only once (and the players know it). 
Make the traditional assumptions complete with the analysis of sociomatrix: there is no social 
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relation between them, so it is a null-dyad (see sociomatrix 1)2. In the simplified model 
situation the buyer and the seller can choose whether they co-operate (behave according to the 
rules) or defect (behave opportunistically). The payoff matrix 1 shows the possible outcomes 
of the simplified strategic interaction and the players’ utilities  and the order of their 
preferences. 
 
 
Payoff matrix 1                 Sociomatrix 1 
   A2        
 
      
 A1   
 
 
C: Co-operate (behave according to the rules) 
D: Defect (behave opportunistically) 
 
Preference order of A1: DC>CC>DD>CD 
Preference order of A2: DC>CC>DD>CD 
 
 
We can see that the buyer and the seller find themselves in the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. 
The natural outcome of the game is mutual defection, as both players’ dominant strategy is to 
behave opportunistically. The solution is optimal from the point of the individual interest but 
suboptimal from the point of the common interest: though none of the participants can 
improve their own situation with a biased step, but the CC outcome of the game provides a 
better result for both players. In another way:  the solution of the game is Nash-equilibrium 
and Pareto-suboptimum. Consequently, the buyer and the seller fell into such a social trap 
where significant strain arose between the individual and collective interests. Will the 
situation change if they are continuously interacting on the market?   
 
 
2.1 CO-OPERATION IN BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIP AS A TWO-PERSON 
ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME: TRUST AND CO-OPERATION    
 
Let’s modify the first example. The buyer and the seller are continuously interacting on the 
market on the long run (Opp 1987). Henceforward the players play the game several times 
and do not know which game will be the last interaction (assumption of “infinite iteration”). 
In iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma situations – known from scientific literature – it may be worth 
trying new strategies (Axelrod 1989). Suppose that from now on the players can choose 
between the always defect (AD) and the Tit for tat (TFT) strategies. TFT: in the first game the 
player co-operates (behave according to the rules), then in the rest of the games the player 
always does what his partner did in the previous game (if his partner behaved according to the 
rules, he behaves according to the rules too, if his partner behaved opportunistically, he does 
so). Let’s introduce into the model the W probability parameter which refers to the players’ 
subjective expectation while considering the iteration of the game. Its value can change 
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 The main diagonal of the sociomatrix is empty as we examine social relations and exclude 
reflexive relations. 
 
C D 
C 2,2 0,3 
D 3,0 1,1 
A1 A2 
A1 - 0 
A2 0 - 
between 0 and 1: if the players know that they will play the game only once (model 1), then 
W=0, but if they are completely sure of the iteration of the game, the value of the probability 
parameter is 1. (Simply, the value of W is the same for both players.)  Payoff matrix 2 
provides information about the possible outcomes of the game and the players’ payoffs under 
the above conditions (Miller 1994) . 
 
 
Payoff matrix 2     
A2 
 
 
A1 
 
           
As we can see, the players’ payoffs will be 2-2 units in the first game if they both choose TFT 
strategy (Payoff matrix 1). Then in every turn of the game the payoffs will be the value of the 
original payoff weighted with W: 
 
 
TFT/TFT 
 1.turn 2.turn 3.turn … 
A1.player 2 (C) 2W (C) 2W2 (C) … 
A2.player 2 (C) 2W (C) 2W2 (C) … 
 
If we modify this infinite sequence – with the help of well-known mathematical operations - , 
then we get the payoff matrix value seen in the left hand cell on the top of Payoff matrix 2: 
 
2+2W+2W2+…=2(W0+W1+W2+…) =2(1/(1−W))=2/(1−W) 
 
 
In those cases when one of the players chooses AD, and the other chooses TFT strategy (see 
Payoff matrix 2) both of them will defect from the second turn of the game, and their payoff 
will be the one-shot game’s 1-1 unit weighted with W in every turn. The player playing AD 
strategy gets 3 payoff units, while the other one playing TFT strategy gets 0 payoff unit in the 
first run: 
 
 
 TFT/AD 
 1.turn 2.turn 3.turn … 
A1.player 0 (C) W (D) W2 (D) … 
A2.player 3 (D) W (D) W2 (D) … 
 
After the mathematical modifications of this infinite sequence, we get the following payoff 
values: 
 
0+W+W2+…=−1+1+W+ W2+…=−1+1/(1−W) 
3+W+W2+…=  2+1+W+ W2+…=  2+1/(1−W) 
 
Finally, if AD strategy plays against AD strategy, the players get 1-1 payoff unit in the first 
run (Payoff matrix 1), then they get the value of the original payoff unit weighted with W: 
 TFT AD 
TFT 2/(1−W), 2/(1−W) −1+1/(1−W), 2+1/(1−W) 
AD 2+1/(1−W), −1+1/(1−W) 1/(1−W), 1/(1−W) 
 AD/AD 
 1.turn 2.turn 3.turn … 
A1.player 1 (D) W (D) W2 (D) … 
A2.player 1 (D) W (D) W2 (D) … 
 
Thus we can count the payoff values seen in the right hand cell at the bottom of Payoff matrix 
2: 
 
1+W+W2+…=1/(1−W) 
 
The natural outcome of the game (Payoff matrix 2) depends primarily on the W value.3 If W 
value is low, namely the players see very little chance of the iteration of the game, the natural 
outcome is mutual AD, as AD is the further dominant strategy for both players.  In another 
way: if the players don’t trust in the continuation of the interaction in a longer term, they will 
go slow. For example, if we substitute W=1/3 value into Payoff matrix 2, the result will be: 
 
 
Payoff matrix 2.1 
   A2        
 
      
 A1   
 
 
 
 
Payoff matrix 2.1 clearly shows that AD is the dominant strategy for both players and the 
natural outcome of the game is mutual AD. This solution further ensures the success of 
individual interest (Nash-equilibrium), but does not guarantee collective optimum (Pareto-
suboptimum). In another way: if the players don’t trust in the iteration of the game, they will 
remain the prisoners of the social trap. If W value is low, defection pays its way for the 
individual in the long term. 
Let’s have a look at the changes, if we substitute W=2/3 value into Payoff matrix 2:   
 
 
Payoff matrix 2.2  
   A2        
 
      
 A1   
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 Of course it also depends on the utility values of the original payoff matrix. These values 
become particular values in particular analyses. In our example the given (abstract) value has 
a more technical rather than an essential significance. 
 
TFT AD 
TFT 3,3 0.5,3.5 
AD 3.5,0.5 1.5,1.5 
TFT AD 
TFT 6,6 2,5 
AD 5,2 3,3 
Payoff matrix 2.2 shows - if the players see a high probability of the iterated interactions -, 
that the players have no dominant strategy at all. The game has two Nash-equilibria: mutual 
AD and mutual TFT. Both players’ best reply is AD for AD strategy and TFT for TFT 
strategy. If A1 expects A2 to always defect, his best reply will be to defect as well. In reverse 
order: if A2 expects A1 to always defect, his best reply will be to defect as well. This solution 
is Pareto-suboptimum too. If A1 expects A2 to play TFT strategy, his best reply will be to 
choose TFT strategy. In reverse order: if A2 expects A1 to play TFT strategy, his best reply 
will be to choose TFT strategy. But this solution is already Pareto-optimum: it ensures the 
success of individual and collective optimum interests. 
 
As we have seen above, if W value is high, AD is not the dominant strategy of the players in 
the two-person iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. It means, if the players trust in the 
continuation of the interaction, and they contribute W a relatively high subjective probability 
value, then there is a chance of reaching the Pareto-optimum equilibrium. From now on this 
this kind of subjective expectation is called iteration-trust.  In our experiment if iteration-trust 
is high, the outcome of the game depends on the players’ mutual expectation.4 The condition 
of the evolution of the spontaneous cooperation is that both persons must expect their partner 
to play TFT strategy. This mutual subjective expectation is called strategy-trust from now on. 
The low level of strategy-trust means that both players expect that his partner will play AD 
strategy, whereas its high value means that the partners mutually expect each other to play 
TFT strategy. Thus we may have reason to expect the evolution of spontaneous co-operation 
in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games, if the level of iteration-trust and strategy-trust is high. 
Consequently, if the players both trust in the iteration of the interaction and the partner’s TFT 
behaviour, then they have a chance of escaping from the social trap.    
 
So we can go further and develop a hypothesis on the basis of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
model. 
 
 
Hypthesis1: If in two-person buyer-seller relationship as iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games 
the level of iteration-trust and strategy-trust is high, then – on the basis of the mechanisms of 
rational strategic choices and expectations – mutual co-operation will spontaneously evolve 
(which ensures the success of individual and collective interests at the same time). 
 
   
The following questions can arise: When can we expect the formation of high level iteration-
trust and high level strategy-trust? In another way: what kind of two-person (dyadic) 
mechanisms can contribute to the evolution and continuation of the high level iteration-trust 
and high level strategy-trust? 
 
 
2.2 CO-OPERATION IN BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIP AS A TWO-PERSON 
ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME: BALANCED DYAD AND TRUST 
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 We don’t consider how our recommended trust-concepts relate to the different trust-theories 
of different social sciences. Valuable information is available in the Hungarian scientific 
literature concerning the different trust concepts: Szabó, 2004. 
 
The iteration of the two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma provides the possibility of the formation 
of a certain social relation, between the buyer and the seller during the long run interaction on 
the market. There is a bigger probability, that during the continuous interaction - on the basis 
of social learning mechanisms – the players get acquainted with each other, gain mutual 
experiences about each other rather than they would further remain socially isolated. Thus the 
probability of creating either a positive (sympathy, friendship, intimacy) or a negative 
(antipathy, hostile or distrustful) relation between the buyer and the seller is much bigger, 
rather than no social relation would develop between them at all (Khanafiah-Situngkir 2004). 
We consider these relations directed-signed-graphs. The chance of the cessation of the 
interpersonal lack of relation (null-dyad), in the form of either sympathy (+) or antipathy (-), 
is bigger than the continuation of the lack of relation. 
 
 
Pr (A12=0 → A12=+) › Pr (A12=0 → A12=0)   
Pr (A12=0 → A12=−) › Pr (A12=0 → A12=0) 
Pr (A21=0 → A21=+) › Pr (A21=0 → A21=0) 
Pr (A21=0 → A12=−) › Pr (A21=0 → A21=0) 
 
Let’s assume in the model, that the probability of the formation of sympathy and antipathy 
relations is equal. On its basis four logically possible dyad-configurations can develop. The 
first two ones are unbalanced, and the last two ones are balanced configurations (Taylor 
1967). If sympathy and antipathy are present at the same time in the dyad (sociomatrix 2.1), 
then this relation will not remain for long, whereas mutual sympathy and mutual antipathy 
(sociomatrix 2.2) can be regarded as stable relations.   
 
 
   Sociomatrices 2.1: unbalanced dyads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Sociomatrices 2.2: balanced dyads 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the players of the unbalanced and instable relations mental discomfort and psychical strain 
can arose. In order to reduce strain the players try to achieve balanced and stable relations: 
with the help of certain dissonance-reduction mechanisms they form their relations so as to 
develop mutual sympathy or mutual antipathy (Zajonc 1960, Taylor 1967, Hummon-Doreian 
2003).  Mutual sympathy can remain for a long time. Experiencing long term mutual 
antipathy is even better for the players – as they can handle strain somehow – than an 
unbalanced relation. (At the same time mutual antipathy can get even worse and finally the 
relation breaks up.)  
A1 A2 
A1 - − 
A2 + - 
A1 A2 
A1 - + 
A2 − - 
A1 A2 
A1 - + 
A2 + - 
A1 A2 
A1 - − 
A2 − - 
 Let’s consider our example again: if the buyer and seller are continuously interacting on the 
market, they get acquainted with each other from time to time. It is very likely that mutual 
sympathy-antipathy relations will evolve between them. It is probable too, that these relations 
will become balanced in the form of mutual sympathy or mutual antipathy.   
 
As we have seen above the iteration of buyer-seller relation will probably lead to the cessation 
of the original null-dyad situation. In another way: there is a big chance of the formation of 
relatively stable and balanced social relations between the players as a by-product of the 
iterated market interaction.  Mutual sympathy positively and mutual antipathy negatively 
influences the evolution of high level iteration-trust and high level strategy-trust. Our next 
hypotheses are the following:  
 
Hypthesis2:  
If the two-person buyer-seller relationship as Prisoner’s Dilemma game is repeated, then – as 
a result of social learning and dissonance-reduction mechanisms – stable and balanced 
interpersonal relations (mutual sympathy, mutual antipathy) will evolve between the players.  
 
Hypthesis3: 
If mutual sympathy evolves between the buyer and the seller, then high level iteration-trust 
and high level strategy-trust will be formed. 
 
Hypthesis4: 
If mutual antipathy evolves between the buyer and the seller, then low level iteration-trust and 
low level strategy-trust will be formed. 
 
Next, we try to answer the following questions: what kinds of social network mechanisms can 
contribute to the formation of social relations – which are the bases of trust - in three- and 
multi-person iterated buyer-seller relationships? When can we count with the evolution of the 
high level iterated-trust and high level strategy-trust - which are the bases of co-operation - if 
there are more than two players in the game? 
 
 
3 CO-OPERATION IN BUYER-SELLER NETWORK AS A MULTI-PERSON 
ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME 
 
Let’s modify our example again. This time many buyers and sellers are continuously 
interacting on the market on the long run. The postulates of the game are unchanged: the 
players are instrumentally rational (utility maximizer) and selfish, and the game is supposed 
to be played “infinitly iterated”. Profit matrix 3 shows the possible outcomes of the quasi-N-
person variation of the game.  
 
Payoff matrix 3  
   
Everybody else: A2….An  
 
A1 
 
 
TFT AD 
TFT P Q 
AD R S 
In harmony with the earlier results, in the multi-person games we also accept that AD will not 
be the dominant strategy of the players if the iteration- trust is high. Furthermore, if high level 
iteration-trust always comes with high level strategy-trust, then there is a chance of stabilizing 
the co-operation, namely, the players will mutually choose TFT strategy. In our multi-person 
model we also expect that the original lack of relation (sociomatrix 3.1) will be replaced by 
social networks consisting of positive or negative interpersonal relations (sociomatrix 3.2). 
 
 
Sociomatrix 3.1      Sociomatrix 3.2    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the basis of our earlier two-person model the interpersonal relations move into the 
direction of balance, furthermore mutual sympathy positively influences the evolution of 
trust-forms which are fundamental for the co-operation. That is why we should examine at 
first the mechanisms of structural balance in the multi-person situations too. The matrices of 
multi-person groups also contain interpersonal sympathy-antipathy relations: the structural 
balancing characteristics of complex networks can be attributed to the balancing 
characteristics of dyads or triads. In another way: in social networks the microfoundations of 
global balancing mechanisms is constructed from two- and three-person balancing 
mechanisms (Khanafiah-Situngkhir 2004, Park 2004). After a while the unbalanced dyads 
become balanced dyads as we have seen earlier. That is why, from now on we consider the 
two-person relations as undirected signed graphs (+,–).5 On the basis of all these, at first we 
analyse the three-person relations. 
 
 
3. 1 CO-OPERATION IN BUYER-SELLER NETWORK AS A THREE-PERSON 
ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME: BALANCED TRIAD AND TRUST 
 
During the repetition of the three-person iterated buyer-seller interaction – similarly to the 
two-person iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma – the players get acquainted with each other, and it is 
very likely that mutual sympathy-antipathy relations will evolve between them. The same 
mechanisms operate as earlier: social learning and gaining experiences. In the three-person 
situations on the basis of the classical structural balancing theories (Heider 1946, 1958, 
Newcomb 1961, Cartwright–Harary 1956, Harary–Norman–Cartwright 2004) eight 
configurations can develop: four of them are unbalanced and unstable configurations, and four 
are balanced and stable configurations. Let’s assume that the probability of their evolution is 
equal.  
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 In another way: we exclude the unbalanced relations in sociomatrix 2.1 and consider only 
the balanced relations in sociomatrix 2.2. These symmetrical relations we consider undirected 
signed graphs. In the sociomatrix it means that Aij has always the same sign as Aji. 
 
A1 A2 … An 
A1 - – … + 
A2 + - … – 
… … … … … 
An + – … - 
A1 A2 … An 
A1 - 0 … 0 
A2 0 - … 0 
… … … … … 
An 0 0 … - 
 
Sociomatrices  3. 1. 1: unbalanced triads 
 
 
 A) My friend’s friend is my enemy. 
 
 
 
 
 B) My friend’s enemy is my friend.  
 
 
 
 
 C) My enemy’s friend is my friend.  
 
 
 
 
 D) My enemy’s enemy is my enemy. 
 
 
 
 
Sociomatrices  3. 1. 2: balanced triads 
 
 
 
 E) My friend’s friend is my friend.  
 
 
 
 
 
 F)  My friend’s enemy is my enemy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 G) My enemy’s friend is my enemy. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 H) My enemy’s enemy is my friend.  
 
 
 
A1 A2 A3 
A1 - + − 
A2 + - + 
A3 − + - 
A1 A2 A3 
A1 - + + 
A2 + - − 
A3 + − - 
A1 A2 A3 
A1 - − + 
A2 − - + 
A3 + + - 
A1 A2 A3 
A1 - − − 
A2 − - − 
A3 − − - 
A1 A2 A3 
A1 - + + 
A2 + - + 
A3 + + - 
A1 A2 A3 
A1 - + − 
A2 + - − 
A3 − − - 
A1 A2 A3 
A1 - − − 
A2 − - + 
A3 − + - 
A1 A2 A3 
A1 - − + 
A2 − - − 
A3 + − - 
In the unbalanced and unstable triads similarly to the two-person unbalanced situations, strain 
arises in the players. To reduce mental discomfort, here the players also try to achieve 
balanced and stable relations: with the help of certain dissonance-reduction mechanisms they 
try to form their relations so as to get into a balanced and stable triad (Zajonc 1960, Hummon-
Doreian 2003). As a result, the evolution of an A type complex sympathy-triad (“sympathy-
clique”), or a B), C), D) type one sympathy-two antipathy triad-configuration is probable to 
be evolved. The common characteristic of the latter types is, that the two players’ common 
enemy is the third player (“common-enemy-triad”). It is likely that sympathy-clique 
positively influences the evolution of high level iteration-trust and high level strategy-trust on 
the level of the complete triad. In the case of common-enemy-triads we expect that a high 
level iteration-trust and a high level strategy-trust will evolve between the players, whereas 
towards the common enemy the level of strategy-trust is very low from both directions (at 
least the level of iterated trust is high because of the relatively stable situation). 
 
Going back to our example, if three market agents (for example two buyers and one seller) are 
continuously interacting on the market, they will get acquainted with each other. It is probable 
that sympathy-antipathy relations will evolve between them and soon the relations will 
become balanced. If sympathy-clique is formed, then the three players are expected to choose 
TFT strategy and they will behave according to the rules, whereas in the common-enemy-
triad the two friends will behave according to the rules and their common enemy will behave 
opportunistically. (Of course the long term continuation of the latter status can be doubtful, 
because the situation may get worse.) 
Concerning the three-person buyer-seller situations our new hypotheses are the following. 
 
Hypothesis5:  If  the three-person buyer-seller relationship as Prisoner’s Dilemma game is 
iterated, then – as a result of social learning and dissonance-reduction mechanisms – stable 
and balanced interpersonal relation-configurations (sympathy-clique, common-enemy-triads) 
will evolve among the market players.  
Hypothesis
 6: If sympathy-clique is formed among the market players, then high level 
iteration- trust and high level strategy-trust will evolve. 
 Hypothesis 7: If common-enemy-triad is formed among the market players, then high level 
iteration- trust and high level strategy-trust will evolve among the friends, whereas low level 
strategy trust will evolve among the friends and the common enemy. 
 
Finally, let’s examine how structural balance and trust are formed in the more than three-
person buyer-seller relations, and how they influence the chances of the evolution of co-
operation on the market.  
 
 
 3. 2 CO-OPERATION IN BUYER-SELLER NETWORKS AS A MULTI-PERSON 
ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME: BALANCING SOCIAL NETWORK 
AND CO-OPERATION POTENTIAL 
 
In our last model we wonder how three-person structural balancing mechanisms contribute to 
the balance of complex buyer-seller networks, and what kind of trustful relations and co-
operational forms can be evolved on the level of complex market networks. On the basis of 
the fundamental hypothesis of structural balance (Doreian 2004: 282), sympathy-antipathy 
networks will alter towards structural balance: the degree of balance will increase. This 
fundamental hypothesis – in spite of the fact that some latest empirical researches have (at 
least partially) confirmed – is regarded too general by the scientific literature (Szántó 2006: 
132). It is worth dividing it into partial hypotheses: for example, we examine separately the 
decrease of the degree of different type unbalanced triads, or we examine separately the 
increase of different type balanced triads. These fine analyses can give a better result of the 
operational dynamism of mechanisms on complex network level. In our approach it is worth 
separately developing our hypotheses, which concern the degree of the increase of sympathy-
clique, or common-enemy-triads. But at first, let’s see how we can measure the level of the 
multi-person networks’ structural balance. 
 
Khanafiah és Situngkir (2004) suggest two indexes for explaining the balance of multi-person 
sympathy-antipathy networks. The global balance index relates the number of all balanced 
triads to the number of all possible triads, whereas the local balance index relates the number 
of all the balanced triads to the number of all existing triads in the given network. In our 
approach it is expedient to use the local balance index, because for us, primarily the actually 
forming triads are important. Moreover, to develop a proper hypothesis, it is practical to 
define local balance index as sympathy-clique and common-enemy-triads. In the first case we 
relate the number of sympathy-clique, and in the second case we relate the number of 
common-enemy-triads to the number of all existing triads. 
 
Our hypotheses concerning the multi-person situations are the following. 
 
Hipothesis8: If the multi-person buyer-seller relationship as Prisoner’s Dilemma game is 
iterated, then – as a result of social learning and dyadic/triadic balance mechanisms – the 
balance of complex market networks increases: the proportion of sympathy-clique and/or 
common-enemy-triads will increase in all the triads.  
Hipothesis 9: If the proportion of sympathy-clique increases, then the proportion of the 
players choosing TFT strategy will increase in the complex market networks (the co- 
operational potential of the complex market networks will improve).  
Hipothesis 10: If the proportion of common-enemy-triads increases, then the proportion of the 
players choosing TFT and AD strategy will increase at the same time: the proportion of 
players choosing TFT increases in a rapid pace, whereas the proportion of AD strategy 
increases in a slow pace (the co-operational potential of the complex market networks will 
partially improve).  
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In our study we introduced models and formulated hypotheses (which can be empirically 
tested) about the possible relations of trust and co-operation in different kind of buyer-seller 
relationships. We defined trust-forms which are the conditions of the evolution of 
spontaneous co-operation in iterated buyer-seller interactions as Prisoner’s Dilemma 
situations. In our hypothesis we state, that the high level iterated-trust is necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for the evolution of co-operation and it can contribute to the formation of 
co-operation only together with high level strategy-trust. Then we outlined those two- and 
three-person social balancing mechanisms which contribute to the evolution of trust on the 
one hand, and comprise the basis of structural balancing dynamism in the sympathy-antipathy 
network on the other hand. Our expectation is that mutual sympathy- and sympathy-clique 
(and partially the common-enemy- triad) contribute to the evolution of trust-forms which 
provide the bases of co-operation in multi-person market situations. 
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